Statement of Evidence - Part 3 - Statement filed May 21, 2019 (2024)

Case

Juana Barbosa de Pinto vs Narek Avetisyan

Jul 09, 2024 |Hamilton, Jr., Jeffrey Y. |22 Unlimited - Auto |24CECG02851

Case

Maria Hernandes vs. Hiram Mahmoud

Jul 08, 2024 |Skiles, Jon M |46 Unlimited - Uninsured Motorist |24CECG02874

Case

John Doe vs. Washington Unified School District

Jun 28, 2024 |23 Unlimited - Other PI/PD/WD |24CECG02799

Case

Michelle Quintero vs The City of Fresno

Jun 28, 2024 |Tharpe, D Tyler |22 Unlimited - Auto |24CECG02800

Case

Dominique Hernandez vs Gloria Marquez

Jul 09, 2024 |Whalen, Robert |E-Filing: Petition - Harassment (With Violence) |24CECG02840

Case

Security National Insurance Company vs. Shawn Mitchell

Jul 05, 2024 |Tharpe, D Tyler |23 Unlimited - Other PI/PD/WD |24CECG02868

Case

Celeste Reyes vs. Kamaljit Singh

Jul 11, 2024 |Culver Kapetan, Kristi |23 Unlimited - Other PI/PD/WD |24CECG02875

Case

Carlos Carrillo-Garcia vs Gloria Ramirez-Torres

Jul 01, 2024 |22 Unlimited - Auto |24CECG02808

Case

Ayden Smith vs. Fresno Unified School Disctrict

Jul 03, 2024 |Skiles, Jon M |23 Unlimited - Other PI/PD/WD |24CECG02854

Ruling

Isaac Clark vs. Jason Pritchard, SR

Jul 10, 2024 |21CECG03472

Re: Clark v. Prichard, Sr., et al. Superior Court Case No. 21CECG03472Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 (Dept. 503)Motion: Defendants’ Motion for Summary JudgmentTentative Ruling: To grant the motion for summary judgment on behalf of all defendants. (Code Civ.Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) Within five days of service of the order defendants shall submitto this court a proposed judgment consistent with this summary judgment ruling.Explanation: The First Amended Complaint alleges that on or about November 6, 2020, Plaintiff,a minor, was a guest at the home of defendants Jason Mengior Pritchard Sr., Jason M.Pritchard II (“Jason II”), David Garrett and Desiree Garrett. Defendants allegedly gavealcoholic beverages to plaintiff and provided more alcohol after plaintiff was obviouslyintoxicated. Plaintiff left the location, apparently on foot, and was struck by a car. The parties are all in agreement that plaintiff’s negligence claim relies onapplicability of the exception of Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (d), to the social hostimmunity set forth in section 1714.1 Plaintiff must plead and prove as to each defendantthat: (1) defendant is a parent, guardian, or another adult; (2) defendant knowinglyfurnished alcoholic beverages; (3) at defendant’s residence; (4) to a person defendantknew or should have known was under 21 years of age; and (5) defendant’s furnishing ofalcoholic beverages to the minor was a proximate cause of injury to the underageperson. (See, Civ. Code § 1714, subd. (d)(1).) A moving defendant “has two means by which to shift the burden of proof undersubdivision (o)(2) of section 437c to the plaintiff to produce evidence creating a triableissue of fact. The defendant may rely upon factually insufficient discovery responses bythe plaintiff to show that the plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of the causeof action sued upon. Alternatively, the defendant may utilize the tried and true techniqueof negating (‘disproving’) an essential element of the plaintiff’s cause of action.”(Brantley v. Pisaro (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1592, 1598, citations omitted.) Defendants take both approaches. The court need not address the argumentsrelating to plaintiff’s allegedly factually devoid discovery responses, as the end resultwould be that “the burden of production [is] shifted to [plaintiff] once defendants movefor summary judgment and properly present plaintiff[’s] factually devoid discoveryresponses.” (Andrews v. Foster Wheeler LLC (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 96, 106–107.)1Defendants show, and plaintiff does not dispute, that Business and Professions Code section25658 does not create any civil liability in social hosts who provide alcohol to those under 21.(Bass v. Pratt (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 129, 134.)Defendants already succeed in shifting the burden of production to plaintiff through theirdeclarations. The motion is supported by a declaration from each defendant, negating one ormore required elements of the social host immunity. According to the declarations, (a)none of them provided alcohol to plaintiff, (b) Jason Sr., David, and Desiree were notpresent at the subject property on November 5-6, 2020, and (d) the subject property wasnot the residence of the one defendant on the property at the time of the party, JasonII. The declarations alone, to which there is no objection, are sufficient to shift theburden to plaintiff. Plaintiff presents evidence that he was under the age of 21 onNovember 6, 2020. (See Estrada Decl.) In the opposition filed after being granted acontinence to conduct discovery, plaintiff submits no evidence supporting liability of anydefendant except Jason II. However, plaintiff fails to show the existence of a triable issue of material facts asto one element. Jason II states that on the dates in question, the Subject Premises, E. DakotaAvenue, was not his residence. He also states that he did not furnish plaintiff with alcoholon those dates. Evidence submitted with the opposition shows that Jason II lived at 6 E. DakotaAvenue address. (Exhibit Z, Jason Pritchard II Depo., 13:13-16.) Plaintiff’s UMF mischaracterizes this evidence as Jason II testifying that he“purposefully opened up his residence to provide a location for minors to consumealcoholic beverages.” The testimony cited says nothing of minors or the ages of the“friends”, or even that plaintiff was one of the friends Jason Pritchard II invited. In any case, it is unclear why Jason II would state in his declaration that the SubjectPremises was not his residence, as he stated in a verified discovery response that it was.(See Plaintiff’s Exh. P.) There is clearly a triable issue on this element. But plaintiff also has the burden of proving that each defendant knowingly“furnished” alcoholic beverages to plaintiff. (See Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (d)(1).) JasonII negates this element by stating in his declaration, “On November 5th and 6th, 2020, Inever furnished, provided, sold, or gave alcohol at the Subject Premises to Plaintiff ISAACAARON CLARK.” (Jason II Decl., ¶ 6.) While Jason II testified that he had friends over on that occasion so they coulddrink, plaintiff does not produce evidence that Jason II personally “furnished” alcoholicbeverages to plaintiff. Jason II stated in response to plaintiff’s discovery that plaintiff andhis friends brought and drank their own alcohol (Exh. Y, p. 7). Plaintiff submits no evidenceto the contrary. Defendants can meet their burden of showing a cause of action has no merit byshowing that one or more elements of the cause of action “cannot be established.” (SeeCode Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Inasmuch as Jason II submits evidence negatingthe “furnishes” element, and plaintiff offers no contradictory evidence, the motion shouldbe granted as to all defendants, including Jason II. There is no need to consider theadditional evidence submitted by defendants with the reply, as the opposition fails toraise a triable issue of material fact as to this element. It is unnecessary to rule on plaintiff’s objections to defendants’ evidence, as thecourt does not rely on any of the evidence to which plaintiff objects. The court sustainsthe objection to paragraph 13 of the Meislin Declaration. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Proceduresection 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute orderadopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerkwill constitute notice of the order.Tentative RulingIssued By: jyh on 7/8/24 . (Judge’s initials) (Date)

Ruling

Jorge Mora vs City of Fresno

Jul 10, 2024 |21CECG00602

Re: Mora v. City of Fresno et al. Superior Court Case No. 21CECG00602Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 (Dept. 503)Motion: By Defendant Eusenia Blanco for Terminating SanctionsTentative Ruling: To deny the motion for terminating sanctions. To grant the alternative relief ofevidentiary sanctions. Defendant Eusenia Blanco is directed to file a proposed orderwithin five days of service of this order by the clerk.Explanation: Code of Civil Procedure section 2023.010, subdivision (g) makes “[d]isobeying acourt order to provide discovery” a “misuse of the discovery process,” but sanctions areonly authorized to the extent permitted by each discovery procedure. Once a motion tocompel answers is granted, continued failure to respond or inadequate answers mayresult in more severe sanctions, including evidence, issue or terminating sanctions, orfurther monetary sanctions. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.290, subd. (c).) Sanctions for failure to comply with a court order are allowed only where thefailure was willful. (Biles v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1327.) If therehas been a willful failure to comply with a discovery order, the court may strike out theoffending party’s pleadings or parts thereof, stay further proceedings by that party untilthe order is obeyed, dismiss that party’s action, or render default judgment against thatparty. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.030, subd. (d).) Generally, before imposing a terminating (“doomsday”) sanction, trial courtsshould usually grant lesser sanctions first, such as orders staying the action until the plaintiffcomplies, or declaring the matters admitted if answers are not received by a specificdate. (E.g., Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 796.) It is only when a partypersists in disobeying the court’s orders that sanctions such as dismissing an action arejustified. The imposition of terminating sanctions is a drastic consequence, one thatshould not lightly be imposed, or requested. (Ruvalcaba v. Government Employees Ins.Co. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1579, 1581.) Terminating sanctions in the first instance may bean appropriate sanction if the abuse of the discovery process is particularly egregious.(R.S. Creative, Inc. v. Creative Cotton, Ltd. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 486, 496 [finding thatterminating sanctions were warranted due to forgery and spoliation of evidence].)However, where lesser sanctions have been ordered, such as an order compellingcompliance with discovery requests, and the party persists in disobeying, the party doesso “at his own risk, knowing that such a refusal provided the court with statutory authorityto impose other sanctions” such as dismissing the action. (Id. at p. 1583; see also Todd v.Thrifty Corp. (1995) 34 Cal. App. 4th 986.) Here, on March 6, 2024, the court order plaintiff Jorge Luis Mora (“Plaintiff”) toserved verified responses to interrogatories and requests for production of documentswithin 10 days of the court’s order to defendant Eusenia Blanco (“Defendant”). Thecourt’s order was served on Plaintiff on March 6, 2024. It appears that Plaintiff neverserved verified responses to any of the discovery requests to date. From the above however, there is no clear demonstration of egregious behavior,or any noted interaction between Defendant and Plaintiff since the entry of the order inquestion. Relatedly, there are no clear demonstrations of multiple acts of disobeying orignoring a court order. The court will not issue terminating sanctions in the first instance.However, in light of the present situation, the court finds that evidence sanctions arewarranted for failure to comply with the order on discovery, which constitutes a misuseof the discovery process. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.030, subd. (c); id., §§ 2030.300, subd.(e), 2031.310, subd. (i).) Defendant is directed to submit a proposed order imposing evidentiary sanctionsrelated to the interrogatories and requests for production of documents that were thesubject of the March 5, 2024, order of the court. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Proceduresection 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute orderadopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerkwill constitute notice of the order.Tentative RulingIssued By: jyh on 7/9/24 . (Judge’s initials) (Date)

Ruling

A. G. vs. Anglican Diocese of San Joaquin

Jul 11, 2024 |21CECG01100

Re: A.G., et al. v. Anglican Diocese of San Joaquin, et al. Superior Court Case No. 21CECG01100Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 (Dept. 503)Motions (x3): by Defendant Jesus Antonio Castaneda Serna for an Order Compelling Responses to 1) Form Interrogatories, Set One; 2) Special Interrogatories, Set One; 3) Request for Production of Documents, Set One; and for Monetary SanctionsTentative Ruling: To deny without prejudice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1015; Cal. Rules of Court, rule1.21(a).)Explanation: The motions cannot be granted, because the service of the subject discoveryrequests is defective. The proofs of service accompanying the subject discovery requestsindicate that defendant served these requests to plaintiff M.S., directly, instead of servingthem to her counsel of record. (See Exhibit A to the Declarations of Colin Murphy, filedon May 2, 2024.) Service to plaintiff was improper, because when a party is represented,the service must be made on the party’s attorney. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1015; Cal. Rules ofCourt, rule 1.21(a).) Plaintiff M.S. was represented by counsel, Abigail Leaf, at the time the movingdefendant served his discovery requests to plaintiff on September 7, 2022. Although Ms. Leaf filed a motion to be relieved as plaintiff M.S.’s counsel and thatmotion was granted on July 12, 2022, the order granting the motion expressly specifiedthat Ms. Leaf’s withdrawal was effective upon the filing of the proof of service of thesigned order upon the client. The proof of service of the order was not filed until January2, 2024, and thus, Ms. Leaf was plaintiff M.S’s counsel of record until January 2, 2024. Therefore, service of the discovery requests directly on M.S. was defective serviceand the motions to compel discovery responses cannot be granted. Proper service ofthe moving papers of these motions does not cure this defect. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Proceduresection 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute orderadopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerkwill constitute notice of the order.Tentative RulingIssued By: jyh on 7/10/24 . (Judge’s initials) (Date)

Ruling

Natasha Smith vs State of California

Jul 11, 2024 |23CECG03598

Re: Natasha Smith v. California Department of Transportation Superior Court Case No. 23CECG03598Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 (Dept. 501)Motion: Defendant City of Fresno’s DemurrerTentative Ruling: To sustain the demurrer to the first cause of action, with leave to amend. To sustainthe demurrer to the second cause of action, without leave to amend. Plaintiff is granted10 days’ leave to file the First Amended Complaint, which will run from service by theclerk of the minute order. New allegations/language must be set in boldface type.Explanation: The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s pleading byraising questions of law. (Plumlee v. Poag (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 541, 545.) The test iswhether plaintiff has succeeded in stating a cause of action; the court does not concernitself with the issue of plaintiff’s possible difficulty or inability in proving the allegations ofhis complaint. (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 697.) In assessing thesufficiency of the complaint against the demurrer, we treat the demurrer as admitting allmaterial facts properly pleaded, bearing in mind the appellate courts’ well establishedpolicy of liberality in reviewing a demurrer sustained without leave to amend, liberallyconstruing the allegations with a view to attaining substantial justice among the parties.(Glaire v. LaLanne-Paris Health Spa, Inc. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 915, 918.) Public entities are not liable for injuries from an alleged act or omission exceptwhere provided by statute. (Gov. Code, § 815; Brenner v. City of El Cajon (2003) 113Cal.App.4th 434, 438.) Claims against public entities must be specifically pled. (Brennerv. City of El Cajon, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at p. 439.)Dangerous Condition of Public Property Government Code section 835 provides the statutory basis for a claim of adangerous condition on public property. (Gov. Code, § 835; Brenner v. City of El Cajon,supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at p. 438.) The elements for a dangerous condition on publicproperty are: “(1) a dangerous condition existed on the public property at the time ofthe injury; (2) the condition proximately caused the injury; (3) the condition created aforeseeable risk of the kind of injury sustained; and (4) the public entity had actual orconstructive notice of the dangerous condition in sufficient time to have taken measuresto protect against it.” (Brenner v. City of El Cajon, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at p. 439.) Adangerous condition is one that creates a substantial risk of injury when used with duecare. (Hernandez v. City of Stockton (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1222, 1230.) The allegations“must establish a physical deficiency.” (Ibid, emphasis in original.) Here,defendant city asserts that plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead the dangerouscondition. Plaintiff alleges that the intersection in question was unreasonably anddangerously designed and maintained and lacked sufficient warning signs or hadobstructed warning signs which cumulatively created a “concealed trap”. (Complaint,¶¶ 27, 30.) Here, calling the defect a concealed trap falls short of actually describing thephysical characteristic(s) of the intersection which were dangerous. Additionally, theclaims of dangerous design, maintenance, and issues with warning signs does not clarifywhat the “concealed trap” was at the intersection or how it trapped plaintiff. Calling thedefect a “concealed trap” is a conclusory statement. As such, plaintiff has not sufficientlypled the dangerous condition. The court sustains the demurrer as to the first cause ofaction, with leave to amend.Negligence Under Government Code section 815, public entities are not liable for an injuryexcept where provided by statute. Plaintiff alleges that defendant city is vicariouslynegligent pursuant to Government Code sections 815.2, 815.4, and 820 regarding thedesign and maintenance of the intersection. (Complaint, ¶¶ 36, 38.) These code sectionsprovide for vicarious liability for acts or omissions of public employees (Gov. Code, §§815.2 and 820) and independent contractors (Gov. Code, § 815.4). Government Codesection 815.4 holds public entities liable for acts of independent contractors to the sameextent liability may extend for a public employee. Under the Tort Claims Act, publicemployees are liable based on their act or omissions to the same extent as privatepersons. (Gov. Code, § 820; Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1128.)Such liability “flows from the responsibility of such an entity for the acts of its employeesunder the principal of respondeat superior.” (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 27Cal.4th at p. 1128.) Defendant city argues there can be no private liability for public employees forconditions of a roadway. Government Code section 840 provides there is no liabilityagainst public employees for a condition of public property caused by the act oromission of the employee. Additionally, public entity liability for property defects isgoverned by Government Code sections 830 to 835, not the general rules of vicariousliability. (Longfellow v. County of San Luis Obispo (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 379, 383.) Wherea public employee is immune, the public entity cannot be vicariously liable for saidemployee’s failures to act. (Ibid.) The court sustains the demurrer to this cause of action,without leave to amend. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Proceduresection 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute orderadopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerkwill constitute notice of the order.Tentative RulingIssued By: DTT on 7/9/2024 . (Judge’s initials) (Date)

Ruling

E. F. vs. Caruthers Unified School District

Jul 11, 2024 |22CECG03587

Re: E.F. v. Caruthers Unified School District Superior Court Case No. 22CECG03587Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 (Dept. 501)Motion: Petition to Approve Compromise of Disputed Claim of MinorTentative Ruling: To grant. Proposed Orders to be signed. No appearances necessary. The court sets a status conference on October 22, 2024, at 3:30 p.m. in Department501 for confirmation of deposit of the minor’s funds into a blocked account. If petitionerfiles the Acknowledgment of Receipt of Order and Funds for Deposit in Blocked Account(MC-356) at least five court days before the hearing, the status conference will come offcalendar. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Proceduresection 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute orderadopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerkwill constitute notice of the order.Tentative RulingIssued By: DTT on 7/9/2024 . (Judge’s initials) (Date)

Ruling

Raymundo Monzon Lopez vs Eric Stine

Jul 11, 2024 |23CECG02228

Re: Raymundo Monzon Lopez v. Eric Stine, et al. Superior Court Case No. 23CECG02228Hearing Date: July 11, 2024 (Dept. 501)Motion: by Plaintiffs for Orders Compelling Defendant Eric Jeffrey Stine to Provide Initial Responses to Form Interrogatories, Set Two; Special Interrogatories, Set Two; Requests for Production of Documents, Set Two; Deeming Matters in Requests for Admissions Admitted, Set Two; and Imposing Monetary SanctionsTentative Ruling: To deny plaintiffs’ motions to compel initial responses to the second set ofdiscovery requests in their entirety, as defendant Stine has now served responses and themotion is therefore moot. To grant sanctions against defendant Eric Jeffrey Stine for theunjustifiable refusal to provide responses to the discovery requests until after the motionsto compel had been filed. Sanctions are in the amount of $1,040.00 and are to be paidwithin 20 calendar days from the date of service of the minute order by the clerk.Explanation: Defendant cites California Rules of Court, rule 3.1348(a), to argue that sanctionsare discretionary if late responses to discovery are served. They are only discretionary asto the requests for interrogatories and production. Regarding the request to deemmatters admitted, “[i]t is mandatory that the court impose a monetary sanction underChapter 7 … on the party or attorney, or both, whose failure to serve a timely responseto requests for admission necessitated this motion.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280.) Defendant’s excuse for why discovery responses were not provided sooner is nota substantial justification for their untimeliness. Defendant claims that his criminal defensecounsel advised him to not provide information to attorneys involved in the civil actionthat could adversely affect Defendant’s criminal case. This is not sufficient to excusedefendant’s untimely responses. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Proceduresection 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute orderadopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerkwill constitute notice of the order.Tentative RulingIssued By: DTT on 6/17/2024 . (Judge’s initials) (Date)

Ruling

Jul 10, 2024 |22CECG02270

Re: J&V Fresno, LLC v. Blunt Superior Court Case No. 22CECG02270Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 (Dept. 501)Motion: by Plaintiff J&V Fresno, LLC, to Enforce SettlementTentative Ruling: To grant the motion to enforce settlement. To grant attorney fees and costs toenforce the settlement agreement in the total amount of $5,785.00. Plaintiff J&V Fresno,LLC is directed to submit to this court, within 10 days of service of the minute orderadopting this tentative ruling, a proposed judgment.Explanation: Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 provides as follows: “If parties to pendinglitigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court. . . for settlement of the case . . . the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuantto the terms of the settlement.” It also provides that the parties may request that the court“retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full ofthe terms of the settlement.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 664.6.) Due to the summary nature of thestatute authorizing judgment to enforce a settlement agreement, strict compliance withits requirements is prerequisite to invoking the power of the court to impose a settlementagreement. (J.B.B. Investment Partners, Ltd. v. Fair (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 974, 984.) Here, plaintiff submits a writing, signed by the parties, made outside the presenceof the court, and the court has agreed to retain jurisdiction pursuant to the parties’stipulation. (Sarabian Decl., ¶ 3, Exh. 1 and 3.) The agreement contemplated therepayment of certain unpaid balances. (Ibid.) The pertinent terms of the settlement wereas such: 1. The parties were to enter into a New Lease of the premises, naming J&V Fresno, LLC as the landlord and Blunt Man, Inc. as tenant. A copy of the lease was attached and “all of the terms of which are expressly incorporated herein by reference.” 2. Defendant Michael Blunt was to execute a personal guaranty guaranteeing the performance of the corporation on the New Lease. A copy of the guaranty was attached and the terms expressly incorporated into the settlement agreement by reference. 3. The Past Due Rent on the original lease in the amount of $200,000 in rent and CAM charges was to be paid at 8% interest and amortized over a ten-year term with the first payment due on October 15, 2023.(Sarabian Decl., Exh. 1, “Settlement Agreement,” ¶¶ 1-3.) Plaintiff J&V Fresno, LLC, moves to enforce the settlement agreement and theincorporated New Lease and personal guaranty thereof by defendant Michael Bluntafter defendant Blunt Man, Inc. terminated its tenancy under the New Lease in March2024 and Mr. Blunt failed to make payments toward the Past Due Rent after January 2024.Where, as it appears here, the terms of another document are intended to beincorporated by reference and the reference is clear and unequoivocal, the contractmay validly include those provisions. (Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60Cal.App.4th 793, 814.) Defendant Blunt argues the judgment cannot be sought against him personallyfor the breach of the lease because Blunt Man, Inc., was party to the lease agreementnot him personally. This argument would have the court disregard the personal guarantyof the new lease signed by Mr. Blunt explicitly stating he is personally liable for paymentsby the corporation and similar language of the settlement agreement (Sarabian Decl.,Exh. 3, “Guaranty of Lease,” p. 2, ¶ 1; Settlement Agreement, ¶ 2.) The language of thecontracts sought to be enforced is clear that the parties intended Mr. Blunt to bepersonally liable for the failure to pay the obligations of Blunt Man, Inc. In a motion to enforce the settlement agreement, and those documentsincorporated therein, the court may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of thesettlement. The judgment sought by plaintiff is supported with evidence and conforms tothe remedies specified within the settlement agreement. There is no clear language with in the settlement agreement or lease as to theremedy for default on the payments of the Past Due Rent. Plaintiff clarifies that thejudgment of the entire balance of the Past Rent Due is not based on terms within thesettlement agreement or lease but is a remedy available under legal principalsapplicable to contracts. (Bowers v. Raymond J. Lucia Companies, Inc. (2012) 206Cal.App.4th 724, 732.) Section 19.2 of the New Lease provides specific calculations of damagesavailable to the landlord in the event of tenant’s breach of the agreement. Plaintiff hassubmitted evidence in support of the estimated vacancy of the property and new leaserate to support the damages requested. (Frechou Decl., ¶¶ 5-9.) Defendant criticizes theevidence as insufficent due to the unique dual character of the property as both a salonand restaurant making it difficult to find comparable properties. However, thedeclaration of commercial realtor Nick Frechou in support of his professional opinionsincludes adequate foundation and explanation for the estimated vacancy and newlease rates. Defendant’s cricicisms of the damage calculations from Certified PublicAccountant Nicholas Georgouses as premised on the unsupported opinions of Mr.Frechou are unwarranted. The judgment sought reflects damages calculated consistent with the terms of thesettlement agreement and both incorporated contracts. As such, the court intends togrant the motion and enter judgment in favor of plaintiff J&V Fresno, LLC, and againstMichael Blunt in the amount of $491.932.00.Attorney’s Fees Plaintiff requests an award of attorney’s fees in connection with this motion as theprevailing party. Counsel attests to having spent twelve hours related to the previousmotion, which was denied without prejudice by the court, an additional seven hourspreparing this second submission and an anticipated five hours preparing a reply andattending the hearing on this motion. Mr. Sarabian bills at a rate of $350 per hour. Thecourt finds it reasonable to award fees for the twelve hours attributed to the currentmotion only, for an award of attorney’s fees in the amount of $4,200. Additionally, plaintiffseeks costs in the amount of $1,585.00 in expert fees incurred related to this motion. Thesecosts are contemplated within the terms of the settlement agreement and are alsoawarded. (Settlement Agreement, ¶ 19.b.) Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Proceduresection 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute orderadopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerkwill constitute notice of the order.Tentative RulingIssued By: DTT on 7/9/2024 . (Judge’s initials) (Date)

Ruling

Deveny Gonzales vs. Consuelo Contreras

Jul 10, 2024 |23CECG02610

Re: Gonzales v. Contreras Superior Court Case No. 23CECG02610Hearing Date: July 10, 2024 (Dept. 503)Motion: Petition to Approve Compromise of Disputed Claim of MinorTentative Ruling: To continue to Thursday, July 18, 2024, at 3:30 p.m. in Dept. 503, to allow petitionerto address the issues explained below. A supplemental declaration of counsel must befiled by 5:00 p.m. on or before July 15, 2024, The continuance is short due to the 30-daydeadline for the court to rule on the petition, mandated by Probate Code section 3505.If more time is needed, petitioner may call the calendar clerk and request acontinuance, referencing the court’s permission given herein.Explanation: The minor’s medical expenses were covered by Medi-Cal, and yet there is acharge from a provider named “Bacci and Glinn – Movedocs.” None of the recordsattached to the petition reflects services from this provider, nor is there any indication, ifthis entity did perform medical services for the minor, that it did not accept payment fromMedi-Cal. The court is aware that some of the records refer to the minor receivingphysical therapy (e.g., Petn. at .pdf pp. 28, 29, 31), so perhaps this entity provided thisservice. But this is not explained. And, if this is a valid medical provider which did notaccept Medi-Cal payments, petitioner must show proof that this provider agreed to thereduction of its lien as stated on page 5 of the petition. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Proceduresection 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute orderadopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerkwill constitute notice of the order.Tentative RulingIssued By: jyh on 7/9/24 . (Judge’s initials) (Date)

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Celeste Reyes vs. Kamaljit Singh

Jul 11, 2024 |Culver Kapetan, Kristi |23 Unlimited - Other PI/PD/WD |24CECG02875

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Maria Hernandes vs. Hiram Mahmoud

Jul 08, 2024 |Skiles, Jon M |46 Unlimited - Uninsured Motorist |24CECG02874

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Norma Martin vs. Henry Gatewood

Jul 02, 2024 |Culver Kapetan, Kristi |23 Unlimited - Other PI/PD/WD |24CECG02856

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Ayden Smith vs. Fresno Unified School Disctrict

Jul 03, 2024 |Skiles, Jon M |23 Unlimited - Other PI/PD/WD |24CECG02854

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Tashawna Bishop vs Joseph Hawkins

Jul 09, 2024 |Hamilton, Jr., Jeffrey Y. |22 Unlimited - Auto |24CECG02909

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Norma Martin vs. Henry Gatewood

Jul 02, 2024 |Culver Kapetan, Kristi |23 Unlimited - Other PI/PD/WD |24CECG02856

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Rob Harvey vs. City of Fresno

Jul 08, 2024 |Tharpe, D Tyler |35 Unlimited - Other Non-PI/PD/WD Tort |24CECG02878

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Security National Insurance Company vs. Shawn Mitchell

Jul 05, 2024 |Tharpe, D Tyler |23 Unlimited - Other PI/PD/WD |24CECG02868